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dent of art. And he will train and control it with a far more scrupulous fidelity.

The subject was further discussed in an informal manner by President Timothy Dwight, of Yale University.

At the close of the discussion, invitations were extended to the members of the association and their guests to visit Mt. Holyoke College at South Hadley during their stay in the vicinity of Springfield, and also to visit the Art Museum of Springfield.

The association then adjourned until evening.

FRIDAY EVENING

The association reassembled at 7:45 and listened with great interest to Professor William M. Sloane, of Columbia University, upon the subject:

HOW TO BRING OUT THE ETHICAL VALUE OF HISTORY

THE ethical value of history! Argument by title is a common form of fallacy and this apparently simple phrase contains an admission which would suffice to call forth the vigorous remonstrances of many thinkers. Some who have but recently passed away and some who are still living, a numerous band of ardent investigators, deny or have denied that the cosmic process is ethical, that there is any other value in the study of history than the discovery of truth, which is sufficient unto itself and must not be profaned by relegating it to a place in a chain of causation. Yet the trend of general thought is, for the moment at least, toward a different philosophic system, a system which makes this topic of ours important and even vital. By one of the inexplicable but frequent antinomies of the human mind there is to be observed a remarkable movement of that liberal thought which rejects the supernatural, to accept a well-developed form of Theism as the basis of belief and of conduct. The rigidity of the cosmic process is denied. Novelty, progress, the ideal are emphasized. The laws of nature are regarded as fixed

habits not as rigid rules. This world is one of mingled permanence and novelty. All conservatives and most liberals are therefore in this remarkable conjuncture agreed that there is an ethical value in history and that it should be set forth with the greatest possible vividness in the teaching and writing of history. Even the most radical admit the sociability of men as a factor in the problem; the course as well as the goal (to use Jean Paul's expression) makes us happy.

Making, therefore, all the admissions necessary to bring us to our theme, dismissing with the contempt which it deserves the cry of "History for history's sake," enforcing the fact that there is an ethical value in history, let us, if possible, sweep away certain conceptions which give rise to countless misunderstandings. Of these the most flimsy, but for all that the most vicious and annoying, is that we study history as an accomplishment merely and for the sake of acquiring information. To have at command great masses of historical facts and to display them as a mere accomplishment is nowadays to be simply a nuisance; the time is gone, and let us hope forever, when knowledge was for the masses an end to itself and when so-called education was a luxury to be displayed like ruffles and laces for its own beauty and for the despair of those who were not fortunate enough to possess it. The dilettante in history should become as much of a fossil as the dinosaur.

Another of the troublesome conceits which crop up on every side and retard us in the task we have undertaken is the notion that history is nothing but a narrative of connected facts, and that the study of history consists in becoming familiar with such a narrative or a succession of them. In this sense history is literature and has precisely the value which is given to it by the author of the book and no more; in narrative history we must have our eye, in other words, not on the subject but on the teacher. It is his authority and not the authority of the investigation which lies behind any precept which may emerge as a rule of conduct. Extended treatises have been written to show how in the terse form of the old English proverb, "Nothing

lies like facts except figures ;" we all know that there is no form of diplomacy so deceptive as that of Bismarck which consisted in telling the truth with the air of prevarication, and no form of falsehood is so elusive as a half truth or a fact taken from out of its connection. There can be no history as there can be no science of any kind without imagination, but we must carefully distinguish between learning and literature, the former being as far as possible impersonal and rational, the latter being to the utmost personal and imaginative. Every writer and every investigator has an intellectual kit of tools before he approaches his work ; there is no absolute impartiality, we enter the world with a set of inherited predispositions, we imbibe axioms and precepts from our mother's milk, we set out on life's path with a pack of intentions, and we are likely to find by the wayside what we are looking for. The narrative or literary historian begins with a thesis and ends with the interpretation which he had by him at the beginning. If there be any analogy to his procedure it is to be found in the persistent interpretation by pious but immoral men of what they are pleased to call "Special providences." On the whole, the ardent and imaginative pleader is the historian who will be the most widely read, and who will perhaps do the most good, provided readers be forewarned as to what the intellectual exercise, in which they are or ought to be engaged, really is, viz., an exercise of critical examination and not of scientific instruction. In this case they cannot fail, instinctively, to apply the law of evidence expressed in the classical admonition to hear the other side.

Another annoying and almost universal preconception is the notion that because true history is scientific there is inferentially a science of history, as there is a science of geology ; that, as we know the earth descriptively, chemically, and dynamically, and can make certain predictions concerning it, so we can know its denizens physically and spiritually, including man, and can make corresponding predictions concerning them. The wildest materialist no longer makes such a claim, but it was made during a period long enough to infect the intellectual classes, not with

conviction but with the vague notion that by indefatigable labor we might hope eventually to secure the data of a science of history, in the common sense of that word, and that, having transformed history, much as alchemy and astrology had been transformed, we were near the wished-for goal of an exact science of history. How well some of us recall the overweening confidence of the prophets of science one short generation ago, that, in the words of Berthelot, all mystery was at an end! With what interest have we watched the great philosophic historians of that school, work their painful way through the labyrinths of complicated epochs, noted their progress, and marked their disappointed mien as they announced the meager conclusions at which they arrived. There are no more pathetic figures before the public today than the apostles of physical science in the world of letters; as physical historians Spencer and Taine stand in lonely grandeur, without a following; Zola and Bourget no longer arouse any emotion but that of pity; Mrs. Cross' efforts and pitiable failure to observe and generalize on the physical basis, like those of her imitators, are felt to be picturesque but not authoritative. Instances might be multiplied, but there is no need; we all know that we are at the end of a phase. The commanding minds of today are not the exact scientists, as were those of yesterday; the commanding liberalism is not materialism but idealism; the seeker after the invisible, the spiritual, has the right of way; Tennyson calls *de profundis* to God, in the clarion, tender cry of the classic, Browning in the stammering tongue of one who, conscious of the Almighty, can find no language wherewith to address him; it is quite as much the philosophic mysticism of Darwin and Spencer, of Mill and Carlyle, of Mrs. Cross and Mrs. Ward, as it is their would-be scientific demonstrations, which interest our generation. In like manner the late strictly scientific definition of history no longer goes; we do not believe that history is past politics and that alone, that its sole business is to establish and correlate facts in secondary chains of cause and effect with a view to securing a connected story of the political life of man. What we demand is a result

of investigation which shall take into account the spirit of the man and the spirit of the race, of the interaction of these upon each other, and of the physical elements of habitat, environment, and structure upon mind, with a due consideration of the reflex action of intellect, spirit, and belief upon all the course of human life. The later phases of the historical philosophy just passing, with much good have done some harm. By them the problem is rendered far more complex, even though it be far more complete and interesting. We have lost a narrow feeling of certitude; to be cock-sure is to repel confidence; but we have gained immensely in the interest and expansiveness of our task. History, being more comprehensive, is more scientific; being intellectual and spiritual it is farther from the limitations of physical science in the narrow sense.

The last of our false impressions to be removed is that which, in view of such considerations, rejects the preaching not only of the church, but even of the novelists like Kingsley, of the critics like Matthew Arnold, yes, of the art apostles like Ruskin, and demands its preaching and guidance from the historian. The universal human craving is for guidance, from the cradle to the death-bed it is felt by the individual, from the days of the cave dweller until the clock struck a few minutes since on the nearest steeple it has been true of man and men. Have it we will, whether we seek it in the reeking omens of bloody sacrifice or in what Hegel calls with pompous phrase the self-determination of the human will. We are all so made that we believe in revelation of some kind, more or less imperfect. There is an interesting identity in processes apparently separated by the whole universe. The savage connects himself with nature through his fetishism; the physical, or physicist, metaphysician constructs a materialistic theory of the universe and seeks to determine man's place in such a universe. There is a parallel identity in the obverse of this. The primitive man protests against the bondage and fear of pitiless natural law by celebrating flower and resurrection festivals; the investigator of humanity seeks for a revelation of some higher power in the study of man, in the

examination of books which purport to be a record of spirit working in man, and, in a forecast of man's destiny as an immortal being. These latter are they who seek guidance in history and look to the historian as their preacher. Discovering social and political problems of vast importance, they demand some solution from those whom they believe to be experts. Having settled in their minds the fixed idea that such solutions can be obtained, they pass easily to the error that they have been found and are available. Unfortunately there are charlatans and sciolists a plenty who are ready to take advantage of the credulous. Such results as there have hitherto been, and they are, alas! but few, are in the way of being philosophical, and not practical, matter for the poet rather than for the statesman and politician. How to secure concrete maxims and render them generally available in pulpit, library, and class room is well worth our earnest consideration.

History in the broad sense is all that has happened in the past, and specifically it is the record of the past. Beginning with the youth of mankind as the story of human society in its relations to natural and supernatural influences, it was of course mythical; then followed the epoch of annals and chronicles; then the days when historical story-tellers held men spellbound by the connected account of marvelous deeds and gratified their curiosity by descriptions of extraordinary experiences. But to the truthful, though gossipy narrators, like Herodotus, there soon succeeded the searching and critical Thucydides, who taught men how to discover facts, how to arrange them scientifically, and how to drag from them their deeper meaning. Thenceforward it has only been a question of dimensions, of subject, of manner, of extent, of relation to other disciplines of the human mind. The discovery by the teaching of evolutionary science, natural and psychological, that all mankind are of one blood has spread almost to universality the belief in the unity of history, and made us adopt the synchronism of facts as a focal idea in our procedure; this circumstance has in a thousand familiar ways revolutionized historical work both in teaching and in

writing, mainly however by the splendid development of the ancillary sciences of archæology, geography, philology, anthropology, and ethnography. Such has become the wealth of information and such the extent of the field that limitation of some sort was imperative and by common consent we have established arbitrary bounds within which we confine the stream, the great central stream, of history. Our one controlling thought is the oneness of the movement and it is only where this movement is affected that we concern ourselves with elements that condition but do not direct. The persons in this movement are civilized men, not prehistoric, or barbarian beings. These although in the outer semblance of men, are destitute of the nature which common consent characterizes as human, and which, since its origin, wherever and however that occurred, has been and will always remain substantially the same. This eminent fact again gives ground for expectation that definite ethical principles can be deduced from the study of history and not merely vague, illusory hopes. The record of civilization, whether written in signs on paper, clay, or stone, is long, ten thousand years, about; and while there are gaps, there are no chasms. Let the geologist and the ethnologist and the archæologist struggle with so-called quaternary or even tertiary man; let the patient investigations of savage, barbarous, and pre-historic human activity continue without ceasing; with all these we are not chiefly concerned, we have a definite field, let us cultivate it only to the landmarks and no farther.

Large as the field is, we freely admit that it is not large enough for the application of the same methods of research as are employed by those who have the universe of natural science within which to collect facts for their generalizations. The greatest logician of our age, John Stuart Mill, expounded this with care and only the superficial assume the contrary. With pure deduction we can have nothing to do, and the basis for induction is insufficient; we are compelled therefore in the historical method of reasoning to combine the two. First, we must generalize on a few well-tested facts and truths, then draw a ten-

tative conclusion; repeating this procedure as often as may be; we then have a series of tentative conclusions wherewith to employ the comparative method; finally, our conclusions must be tested by the principles of psychology, individual and collective. With a conception of this sort something can even now be done, although confessedly no science is more hopelessly chaotic at this moment than psychology with its warring camps of the old and new schools. If there were no other ethical principle to be derived from the study of history, that of patience would stand out, emphasized as nowhere else. In a leading metropolitan newspaper of recent date, a reviewer, presumably a careful and competent man, exclaimed with human but unscientific impatience: "Why does not the author of these ponderous tomes begin by telling us what history as he understands it really is?" In a sense the demand is fair. The outcome of a generation's work has been enormous; the unity of history, the field of investigation, the method; surely the general acceptance of these concepts is much, and while we may hope for a definition of universal validity only when time shall be no more and not till then, yet with these initial doctrines fairly settled and accepted, a partial definition and some results may be hoped for, perhaps in this, certainly in the coming generation.

It is a matter of vast importance that the worker should have a distinct and honest notion of himself. The hallucinations which we cherish about ourselves are instructive and immensely valuable. In our ideals we stand as investigators, dispassionate, impersonal, well trained, with a single eye to the truth. We advance with no guide and in no particular direction, we have nothing to carry except the accumulating stores of knowledge which start forth at our approach to be gathered without effort. Stroke by stroke we reap the harvest until we have a sheaf and this we leave to be garnered and proceed until another is added to our store, and so on indefinitely. These and the like in our ideals are the outlines of the scientific worker, ourselves or another. Is such dreaming merely absurd, we ask when we waken to the full reality of our prejudice, blindness, and slavery.

No, it is dangerous, if you will, in the assumptions of the vain glorious and in the credulity of the blind disciple. But not absurd; for the wisest it has an invaluable and never-to-be-forgotten importance. The existence of such an ideal argues that there is something in every man higher than himself; what is an ideal but a directive idea, the tendency of development, the type forming in the race? The strongest argument for the immortality of the soul is that which Kant drew from the soul's demand for the realization of its own ideal. Theism today rests perhaps its strongest proof for the existence of God on the universality of the idea. In the same way the ideal of an unprejudiced, unbiased, yet well-equipped, historical investigator is a sign in itself of advancement from prejudice and tradition through firmer faith and purer conduct to fuller capacity. But the warning is none the less clear that at this moment we are far enough from the ideal.

What then are the facts of our inherited nature which bear directly on our attempt to wrest and display a body of ethical teaching from the study of history? As a plain man, anxious to be honest with myself and others, it appears to me that the Anglo-Saxon both sides the sea sincerely believes everything good to be rooted and grounded in the past, that he clings with tenacity to every social habit and institution which does not prove directly and visibly harmful. He holds the firm conviction that the aim of society is to render more stable the unstable equilibrium of its structure, a structure formed only after centuries of thought, effort, and sacrifice. This stability, according to his concept, is secured by the variance of the individuals which compose the structure; against it every single person is pushing with more or less vigor according to his or her ability, and the resultant of the pushes secures the equilibrium. The liberal democrat thinks the equilibrium dependent upon the counterthrusts as they are exerted at any given moment, while the conservative holds that the equilibrium is dependent on maintaining the inherent strength of the central, inherited structure or organism; the former thinks the organic functions and

character of society infinitesimal, and thus indifferent; the latter considers them important and vital, not to be lightly disturbed but to be given ample time to perform their tasks. A cement of this social structure there must be, and the Anglo-Saxon has never doubted for an instant that the cement is property. Even now when inventions and manufactures have done their utmost to change the grouping of humanity, delocalizing countrysides, villages, cities, and even nationalities, and thus rendering humanity cosmopolitan, he has the ready retort to all who cavil at his fundamental position: Follow the counsel of perfection, sell all thou hast and give to the poor. In our creed this is to be the goal, the ideal; but, like all human ideals it must be reached gradually and without disturbance of the only process by which it can be reached, to wit, the perfectibility of man in an earthly and possible environment. To strive for the earthly paradise by the short cut of revolution is simply to undo the painful work of ages and begin again the heart-breaking task of experiment and of slow, almost imperceptible, gains.

The American well understands that there is pressing and instant need for rearranging the displaced and vastly increased population of the earth, and he is well aware of the continental European conception of how the problem is to be solved. But for himself he believes that instead of cherishing the collective type of universal humanity by compulsory uniformity, the individual should diverge from it as far as possible within the limits of order, in the expectation of preventing stagnation and stimulating advance and improvement. If the person goes too far in his career of attack, he will, of course, destroy himself and become the martyr who serves either as an inspiration or as a warning, as the case may be. The conservative fears the variation from the type, the radical exaggerates it, the true liberal cultivates it. The multi-millionaire of the industrial world is as much of a radical as the frothy anarchist of the barrooms in his deviation from the type; one abuses the means of self gratification afforded by the present structure of society about as much as the other, the true conservative is the moderately well-to-do,

saving, thrifty worker, who fears lest in changing legislation to thwart license and licentiousness he may unadvisably meddle with liberty of speech and exertion. We sometimes say despairingly that at bottom our conduct is based on pure expediency; if you do not like the conditions under which you were born, try the opposite and see what comes of it. What we want is comfort, money, home, education. We test even religion and church by the standard of utility. There was a time in Anglo-Saxon life when the most important and influential person in any and every society was emphatically the parson, as the word was then pronounced; if we ask why, we must confess that it was not entirely because it was an age of faith and the minister was the spiritual guide of the community, their shepherd in spiritual things; there was a further and probably stronger reason. The English parson and the Calvinistic minister were in the days of their power worldly wise; they taught and emphasized the lesson that piety was quite as important in the world that is as it would be for the world to come, they held their place because they were the counsellors of their flocks in all worldly affairs, the tutors of their people in worldly interest, the men holding themselves responsible for the good conduct and prosperity of the men and women about them. The parson of today suffers in general esteem, not because he is less learned than his predecessor, but because he does not illustrate in himself the practical, worldly results of his calling as the grave, thrifty, well-bred, well-dressed, shrewd, determined clergyman of sixty years since was wont to do. Our clergyman is too often a man from below without the power of self-assertion, too often a teacher of dogmas unrelated to life, a voice crying in the wilderness and not integral to the social life of his day. There is danger that the teacher of history and the historian may fall into like disesteem if they do not soon produce their contributions toward solving the troublesome problems of the day.

Dealing with a public composed of such practical, direct, pertinent individuals, science on the side of nature has thrown many a sop to Cerberus; on the human side it has contributed far more.

It has contrived and kept in a condition of evolution institutions for unifying and balancing the interests of millions and millions where once but thousands could dwell in fellowship; in politics, society, education above all, it has worked a revolution. Moreover, human science has assimilated the method of natural science. The student of life has become both a naturalist and a historian. As a naturalist he examines the habits, manners, tastes, beliefs, instincts of man, with the practical view of the breeder and trainer. As a historian he examines and investigates the antecedent and successive stages of development and association, thought, and conduct; discovering that permanence has been secured by slow processes, he becomes and remains an evolutionist. In other words, the historian of all nations is very largely, if not entirely, in accord with the plain man of Anglo-Saxon birth, as he was sketched a moment since. If the claim be true, then in the highest sense the moderate democrat of this day and this place is the most historic in his sense and instinct of any man now living. That very quality which at first blush seems to us a reproach, and which other nations throw in our teeth as a reproach, turns out to be a precious possession, and the basis for the truest historical insight.

The plain, historic, Anglo-Saxon man must, however, rid himself of two errors to which he is very prone: first, that the criterion of instruction in a democracy is utility; second, that when we reform instruction we reform education, or, in other words, that we can attain character by an exercise of the judgment. The true aim of education is to make an all-round man; not a minister or a professor, not an engineer or a lawyer, not a soldier, farmer, or merchant, but—a personality with the largest possible amount of moral force; in fact, a reservoir of such moral force as is attained by a clear conception of his place in humanity, present and past, in all the life already lived by all men and women. To illustrate the dangers of narrowness we have not far to go. Industrial development has brought back into activity one of the most pestilential social heresies which the world has ever known; an old refuted, worn-out, flimsy creed, that of

socialism, a doctrine into which Aristotle poured the destruction of his logic and flung the conflagration of his scorn, leaving it a torn, charred, fag-end on the rubbish heap of time. But the modern factory multiplied the factory hand, and with the appreciation of the factory hand as a voting force, under democratic institutions, arose a vision in the factory hand's brainstuff such as could only be woven from the shoddy rescued for temporary use from the world's rubbish heap.

The modern factory is the cradle of resurrected socialism. In it men work in common throughout a lifetime, each producing but one part of a whole under a common discipline. The ideal of such human beings must necessarily be communistic life, a life in which the workers are well and kindly treated under a system of profit-sharing and the enforcement of sanitary rules. In this Utopia there must be plenty of rest, cheap and abundant amusement, with books, schools, clothes, and food for the asking. Machine-made wealth and machine-made well-being for the few, were conclusive, practical arguments that well-being and wealth could be manufactured for the many if only the organization and the capital could be found. Both were at hand; the organization is the all-powerful state in which every man has his share or shares by means of his vote; the capital was the sentimental mysticism to which reference has been made, and which was easily enlisted in the cause of "humanity," as it was soon called. The flood of pity overwhelmed politics in the old-fashioned sense altogether and drowned opportunism of every form. Legislation was soon occupied in multiplying restraint on personal action, in supervising contracts, in extending state action, and lawmakers held unity with uniformity before their eyes as the goal of all their efforts. The importance of the mass in relation to the man was magnified out of all proportion. But now communistic mysticism has begun to lose its vogue. It has turned out that we are not all factory hands, the mystery of living remains quite as great as ever, in fact vagueness broods more than ever on the face of all things, and neither human nor natural science has been able to dispel it: the promised land seems no

nearer, in fact it is visibly receding, for every discipline is propounding new problems.

Are we then to swing back to the opposite extreme again, and regard nothing but expediency, utility, and seemliness in our questioning of the past? Far from us be such a fate as the indifference and hollow worldliness of the intellectual generation which was that of our grandfathers; quite as far as the transcendentalism and impracticability of those whose voices are either just vanishing or are heard only like the echoes of a passing call from disembodied spirits. With this determination, with a knowledge of our qualities and limitations, with the conviction that history is neither altogether an art nor altogether a science, but for the moment nothing else than an artistic and scientific discipline, with a view of the proportion between man and man, with definitions of the field, the method, and the object we may humbly and experimentally form an idea of what we are to expect from it in the way of ethical teaching and set out to find it with some expectation of success.

If our assumption be not entirely false, the ethical results of historical work, teaching, or writing, have already been suggested and need only to be stated. They are of three kinds: enlargement of the personal horizon by assimilating the experiences of the race; the relation of man to mankind and the possibilities of the future; the indications that there is something in the universe higher than man or nature. The most philosophical historians are all in substantial agreement about these points, and they may, perhaps, even be called platitudes. But all great thoughts are platitudes; the only originality is in the presentation of them, and for all thoughtful men in particular, the truest originality is in thinking over for themselves the great thoughts of all the ages. The assimilation of race experience is an ever growing familiarity with old ideas behind new faces; with not one, not the present and obvious phase of existence, but with all the phases which have so far exhibited themselves. It has been well said that every heresy is the distortion and exaggeration of some single truth; in like manner few

men are correct in their view of life, simply because they have seen but a single side of it ; to know the transcendent beauty of the diamond we must not fix our eyes on one facet, but we must see them all as a whole, and then the deep clear light of the precious stone reveals itself, then and then only.

The positive good, is, alas ! always to a degree offset by the negative evil and while familiarity with history is sure to reveal the good in human nature, yet it will more frequently expose and lay bare the evil, that quality which the theologians with rhetorical emphasis designate as total depravity. This is the reason why godless men in all ages have been led to preach the gospel of despair. Gibbon thought history little else than a register of crime, folly, and misfortune ; Voltaire reiterated the words and both merely revamped an ancient heathen idea, which represented the affairs of the world as directed by a blind and crazed divinity. On the other hand the less literary but more learned, and scientific historians, have taken a view diametrically the opposite. Thucydides uttered an immortal phrase and Lord Bolingbroke restored it to its proper influence. History is philosophy teaching by example. This means, of course, that while we must carefully note and thoroughly appreciate how utterly bad men can be, yet we will perceive at the close of each series of facts with which we deal, that there is a gain, however small, and that when we come to compare all our tentative conclusions, there arises an infinite probability, undistinguishable from certitude, that all proceeds according to law, and that the law is a law of progress. The wider our experience, the fuller our knowledge, the more valuable are our judgments, and it is a stimulating and invigorating thought that the more learned historians have been the more hopeful, calm, and confident. They have thought it in the words of Pliny the younger, "a noble employment to rescue from oblivion those who deserve to be eternally remembered and by extending the reputation of others to advance at the same time our own." Warning and example, these are the dual ideas which constitute the earliest, easiest, and perhaps the most valuable ethical lesson to be derived from the study of his-

tory. There is not a high-minded man or woman, no matter how humble the opportunity, who cannot enforce this lesson.

Any pursuit concerned with ideal humanity and the near approaches to it, is so far ethical. History, however, does not investigate the nature and constitution of human character individually, at least only in so far as the person is identified with a historic movement, it is concerned with human character in the mass and with formulating the rules which in their observance have led mankind toward the Eternal Right, and the breach of which has overthrown and destroyed great societies. Hence the apparent antinomy which is constantly arising between the public and private duty of individual men. In fact this department of ethics is quite the most complex and difficult of all. That side of historical work which today is generally called research or the labor of erudition, has become fairly scientific, even in the sense of exact science; for every side of it we have a high sounding name, heuristics, diplomatics, epigraphics, palæographics, sphragistics, numismatics, heraldics, and what not; yet under the new régime we have been so busy with these preliminaries that the inverse deduction by which rules are to be secured has been sadly neglected. Rules of historical investigation we have in plenty, and they are excellent; but the rules derived from historical investigation are very few and doubtful. One majestic truth seems, however, to have emerged from the discussion of what are facts and how they are to be recorded; the fact namely, that whether we accept one view or another of history as a written record, there can be no disagreement as to the correspondence between the state of society and the history which is produced in it. There are four stages of Greek political evolution; to these correspond Herodotus with the epic interest of free hand, artistic pictures; Thucydides with his comprehensive brevity, critical exactness, and terse political reflections; Xenophon with his practical views and ethical qualities, and then at the close a decline to inartistic compilation for the gratification of curiosity, from which emerge Dionysius, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Polybius, the comparative, universal, and pragmatic investi-

gators of a dying civilization. Likewise Rome : Sallust, marked by a thoughtful brevity, Cæsar with his brilliant simplicity, Vel-leius Patercalus and his bold character sketches, Tacitus with his pregnant style, moral earnestness, and profound political wisdom ; then the decline ; Suetonius, Valerius Maximus, Aurelius Victor, Eutropius, Ammianus Marcellinus, and all the race of annalists, chroniclers, and compilers down through the Byzantines ; their work sufficiently meritorious in some respects, but all of it nothing but an echo of their predecessors. In Italy there followed each other, Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Paolo Giovio, and Adriani. In France, too, the succession is easily traced : Froissart, Com-ines, Thou, d'Aubigny, etc. ; the parallel will hold everywhere.

But a fact is not a truth without the interpretation which relates it to conduct. What does it mean that the quality of history corresponds so directly to the vigor of social life ? Can it be explained by considering the historical evolution as purely mechanical ? No, the historian is spiritually and individually conscious of something not himself, or in himself, which reacts on all his faculties, and makes him capable of mirroring the social process of which he is a part ; no, his spirit responds to the call of other spirits, and it is the continuity of this interaction which constitutes the continuity of the historical evolution, never broken and revealing itself in direct correspondence with the mechanical and yet not fatalistic elements of the whole process. As the evolution proceeds the mechanism reveals the free spirit within ; as it is retarded or turned on itself at the end of a phase, the spirit seems to withdraw from observation as if to gather strength for the next advance, and the historical expression of the historic process becomes a mechanical chronicle. But again the human spirit reacts on the flexible elements of progress, and again there is an advance to be recorded, with a recorder of suitable strength to perform the task. In the intermittent character of historical writing we actually see what otherwise remains a hypothesis, the struggle of the free and the mechanical elements, neither entirely bad, neither entirely good, and from it we learn with distinct revelation that short, concise, and simple

methods or the expression of them in law are not to be observed in the historical movement, because they do not exist. Uranus and Gaea beget the gods and they are swallowed up by Cronus ; but he in turn brings forth others, among them Zeus, whose mother Rhea, preserves him from the maw of Cronus by guile, and Zeus in turn destroys the older race and sets the Olympians on their career. Thus far in their coarse imagery did the ancients go towards expressing their conception of the fact that there is not merely development in the universe but quite as certainly dissolution, that hope succeeds despair, but that despair again finds ground and sustenance in decay ; what we claim to know is more, that regularity and mechanism disappear at intervals, that they are superseded by spiritual consciousness, and that in the decline of each dispensation there is the germ of a new power, not ourselves, but manifestly in the form of our race, which overcomes the reversal or check and, preserving the continuity of evolution, starts the historic process once more on its way. In this ethical conviction lies the doctrine of the ideal and the relation of man to his race. Mythology in the comparison of religions gives hints of the same truths, but the advance and the records of culture prove it. Human impulse runs down but there is an inexhaustible fountain of spiritual energy from which the race gains new force for the men of succeeding generations.

Coming now to the third class of ethical lessons to be enforced in the study of history, we must never forget that the very idea of progress in human affairs is a modern one and dates no further back than the seventeenth century. It was set forth by four men : Bodin, Bacon, Descartes, and Pascal. These were giants, and from that day to this no able thinker has dared to reject the proposition. With equal steps the notions of physical and human evolution have been steadily amplified and examined in the light of all new knowledge, and, as we have previously remarked, the interest of our time in the work of the physical evolutionists is mainly in the effort to determine its bearing on questions relating to collective human activity and to ethics. Here of course the one important question is the beginning of

mind. There is no explanation in physical evolution, and however much we may dwell on the perfect gradation within series which are known to us as fairly complete, yet we have not crossed the chasm between the organic and the inorganic series, nor have we traced the genesis of direct sensation. Clifford gives up the problem of origins. Clerk Maxwell posits an infinity of homogeneous molecules, and Spencer puts behind these an infinity of homogeneous first elements ; in other words all physical thinkers assume an initial arrangement containing all the potentiality of the rest. This assumption, they know, requires an explanation and they one and all seek it in metaphysics ; materialism, spiritualism, monism, idealism, all alike take on the evolutionary garb and speak the evolutionary tongue without an effort. Hence for our purpose it is not necessary to distinguish among the metaphysical schools and their adherents. These all take one of two views ; some find that the assent to our close relation with the animal world gives us a backward look, makes us rigid determinists, and forbids the idea that there can be any advance in morality beyond that of the absolute first cause which has been from all eternity ; others argue that past kinship with the animals places us of necessity in the most complete opposition to them in the future, and that the aim of morality must be to develop all that distinguishes man from the brute. Man as the last must be the highest product of evolution, hence all things have existed and do exist for his sake, and, in Arnold's words, he is the cynosure of things terrestrial. Here enters the optimist, who sees in the idea of adaptation to environment and the survival of the fittest the guarantee of the millennium ; the best of men in the best of all possible worlds.

Whether then we accept, as religious men in the conservative and Christian sense, the doctrine of the moral order of the universe, or whether we struggle to remove the first cause which we call the creator further and further from our ken by interposing evolutionary processes of indefinite duration (and it makes no difference apparently to which sect of evolutionists we belong), one great ethical lesson shines forth from our study of history,

that progress in some meaning of that much vexed word is a certainty. These are severe abstractions and most of us have little interest in them except as we find some guidance in our more concrete work. But this very direction is what we are seeking. If what we find is corroborative, then we have made a great gain in the comfortable assurance that we are on the right road and have only to advance. Interpretation will come in time, provided only we follow our method, in fact it comes with every step we take. Many are not ready for the evolutionary optimism, but there are few indeed who do not grasp the meliorism or betterment of all human conditions as they observe, note, compare and record or teach the facts of the past and the present. Nor are we unprepared for the waves of pessimism which recur in the history of human thought and are created by the reversals in human experience. In the just consideration of our discipline as a whole we expect the back-flow and the return, but we also know that these are parts of the upward, onward movement, and that in them the primordial influence is preparing the more evident and noticeable advance which is apprehended with ease. The great doctrine of the conservation of energy is just as applicable in history as in physics, and it convinces us of the immanence of the power, not ourselves and higher than ourselves, either individually or collectively, which is continually making for righteousness (to use Arnold's phrase once more).

This is clearly a moral force and an ethical principle of the highest value, no matter whence it is derived. No study can be of the first importance which lacks elasticity and poignancy. These are the essentials of the interest which leads the mind onward and upward; the imagination, the judgment, the heart, and more than all the sense of righteousness must all have play, and this is secured in the study of history along the lines we have been indicating as in no other discipline to which the attention of old and young can be directed. Some art critics say, and there is no longer much effort to gainsay them, that no picture has value unless it expresses a thought; others go further, and many refuse to accompany them, in declaring that the best

pictures must have a moral purpose. But in history there can be no cavilling with the two propositions collectively ; the work must be above all else interesting and in all that concerns man interest is secured by thought, minute or comprehensive, and by aim or ethical quality. The thought and the aim both can be obscured and lost if technique or accomplishment be made the first object, if a personal estimate be made the important note in the pursuit, if more exactness of precept and axiom be expected than ought to be demanded ; in other and shorter phrase, if we try to turn history into art or literature or science. But on the other hand, if we use it to broaden our knowledge of men and ourselves, if we limit our field and follow a correct method in discovering human types and their possibilities so as to prevent all empiricism in politics, and finally if we recognize that there is more in the movement than man puts into it, a law operating not blindly and ruthlessly but when largely considered beneficently and with an immortal and spiritual element revealing itself, then we shall exhibit the ethical principles which inhere in the highest and most intensely interesting of all the studies of the schools. There is possibly no such educational force for the individual as the result reached by the lonely struggle with a temptation or a course of known transgression ; why should there be less value in the effort to discern the errors, follies, and mad blindness of the race and in discerning them, to find the right way to follow that we may leave them far behind. The task is onerous and the way is long ; there is little immediate encouragement ; self-restraint and compulsion are imperative ; but so they are in any occupation that is worth while.

At the close of this address the audience repaired to the café of the high school, where refreshments had been provided, and passed another hour in enjoyable reunion and social converse. The tables were served by a group of young people from the senior class of the school. The Committee of Arrangements for this occasion were Dr. Fred. W. Atkinson, Mr. William Orr, Jr., Mr. Charles F. Warner, and Miss Alice M. Wing.

SATURDAY MORNING

The association reassembled at 9:30 for a business meeting.

The delegates to the Conference on Uniform Entrance Examinations in English presented a report through Dr. Frank A. Hill. The report was accepted as a statement of progress and the committee was continued.

CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS IN
ENGLISH

The Conference met in Philadelphia on Wednesday, December 29, 1897. There were present as delegates: from the Commission of Colleges in New England on Admission Examinations, Professors C. T. Winchester, Albert S. Cook, and L. B. R. Briggs; from the Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools of the Middle States and Maryland, Professors Francis H. Stoddard and G. R. Carpenter, and Principal Wilson Farrand; from the New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools, Dr. Frank A. Hill, Professor Mary A. Jordan, and Mr. H. G. Buehler; from the North Central Association of Teachers of English, Professor Fred N. Scott and Principal C. N. French; and from the Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools of the Southern States, Professor J. B. Henneman.

This being an adjourned meeting of the Conference, Professor Stoddard was retained as chairman, and Professor Cook as secretary. A report having been presented by the committee appointed to consider the advisability of issuing a more detailed statement of the requirements, it was, after discussion,

Voted, that the Conference recommends:

1. That English be studied throughout the primary and secondary school courses, and, when possible, for at least three periods a week during the four years of the high-school course.
2. That the prescribed books be regarded as a basis for such wider courses of English study as the schools may arrange for themselves.
3. That, where careful instruction in idiomatic English translation is not given, supplementary work to secure an equivalent training in diction and in sentence-structure be offered throughout the high-school course.
4. That a certain amount of outside reading, chiefly of poetry, fiction biography, and history, be encouraged throughout the entire school course.
5. That definite instruction be given in the choice of words, in the structure of sentences and of paragraphs, and in the simple forms of narration description, exposition, and argument. Such instruction should begin early in the high-school course.
6. That systematic training in speaking and writing English be given throughout the entire school course. That, in the high school, subjects for